Tag Archives: HS2

Why transport projects keep going wrong

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All over the world transport projects “go wrong”, in the private sector as well as in the public sector. It is not just a British problem – though our disasters seem to be worse than most. A common – almost universal – error at the start of most transport projects is unrealistic initial cost estimates.

There are three major generic causes of cost overruns:

  • The high risks of technological innovation. (The “frontiers of knowledge” are also the frontiers of ignorance!)
  • Changes in project specifications and designs (especially from interfering politicians).
  • Evolving safety and environmental demands (which often seem to get absolute priority, whatever their cost).

All three were prominent in the three government transport project disasters in my 2007 book They Meant Well, Government Project Disasters, namely: The R101 Airship; Concorde; and the Channel Tunnel high-speed rail link to London (HS1). 

But Flyvbjerg (with co-authors), who is the leading expert on this topic, has a more brutal view:

“Cost underestimation and overrun cannot be explained by error and seem to be best explained by strategic misrepresentation, namely lying, with a view to getting projects started. … [They] have not decreased over the past seventy years. No learning seems to take place.”

That is a shocking conclusion, suggesting that, despite past evidence, contingency allowances for cost overruns are still usually much too small. Post-project audits should be essential for all major projects, whether they have “gone wrong” or not.

Revenues from transport projects are also subject to huge margins of error, often being wildly over-optimistic. For example, the (private sector) Channel Tunnel had predicted sixteen million Eurostar passengers in its first full year; but the actual number was only three million. (The 1987 forecast for total Channel Tunnel passengers in 2003 was forty million but the actual number was only fifteen million.) Both passenger volume and average level of fares seem to be hard to guess accurately, especially if one ignores potential competition. 

A further danger for government projects is reluctance to abandon projects even after it has become obvious that they are not viable. According to Peter Jay, Concorde’s advocates constantly employed four red herrings: patriotism; the need to keep up with technological progress; unemployment; and the importance of not offending France. (Britain was trying to join the Common Market at the time!) Roy Jenkins, Air Minister in the first Wilson government, tried to cancel this Anglo-French project in 1964, but soon had to un-cancel it!

For government projects, “national prestige” was often a factor. (Speaking about Concorde, Jo Grimond, the Liberal Party leader, said: “Whenever I hear the word ‘prestige’, my heart sinks.”!) My impression is that “national prestige” was rarely a factor in starting a government project; but was likely to come into play once a project had started to go wrong.

In managing transport projects, there are three essentials:

  • Regular reviews, focusing on the latest estimates of the amount and timing of future cash inflows and outflows.
  • Up-to-date market research to try to reassess likely demand where relevant.
  • An “exit champion” if need be, to argue the case for abandonment.

I would even expand the third point and urge the appointment of at least two “devil’s advocates” from the very start of a project (for private sector projects as well as government projects). Their function would be to question everything – and to criticise and oppose where they thought that sensible. The purpose of formally appointing them would be to legitimise their actions. Otherwise, anyone who queries management decisions is likely to be regarded almost as a traitor. (At least two such appointments, because it is much easier to ignore a single person’s views.) Recommending abandonment – which is difficult – would be one of their potential tasks.

Many private sector projects go wrong too; but I suspect they can be quietly dropped sooner and with less fuss than government projects, where political embarrassment is always likely.  (Cancelling HS2 is a partial exception, because probably a majority of the public think that was a sensible decision, merely delayed for far too long.)

In all six of the government projects in They Meant Well, many of the management failures (though by no means all) were really down to politicians: publishing misleading estimates; installing inadequate or over-complex organisations; appointing incompetent managers; insisting on excessive secrecy (a special weakness of British governments!); funking abandonment; or generally interfering in far too many details, which usually leads to extra costs and expensive construction delays.

Before politicians decide to embark on large quasi-commercial projects, they should provide convincing answers to two questions:

  • Why won’t a private enterprise company undertake this project? (If it will, let it.)
  • Why does government, in contrast, think the project worthwhile?

If private sector companies are unwilling to get involved, one obvious reason may be because they think the risks – on either the costs or the revenues (or both) are too high. Political pressures may push governments towards going ahead, even if they are aware of the likely financial outcome (which they may care about less than profit-seeking businesses.)

Flyvbjerg et al. conclude that even with “government projects”, a significant part of the capital required should be genuine risk capital, with private financiers bearing the consequences of a wrong decision to go ahead. That should help ensure a high degree of involvement by private lenders, which in turn should lead to more effective monitoring, better cost control and also better controls against construction delays.

D.R. Myddelton

Image: gov.uk

Why the UK needs the Rotodyne and not HS2

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The massive investment required by HS2 is wasteful and will provide a very limited set of benefits. This article argues that a better use of funds would be the creation of a compound gyroplane fleet and rooftop landing sites in certain areas of some cities.

The first point to understand is the physics of high-speed transport. An object moving at twice the speed requires four times the energy. An object moving at four times the speed needs sixteen times the energy.

Thus, a train at 300 km/h is sixteen times more energy greedy than one at 75 km/h, which also should explain to the non-engineers and non-scientist minded why freight trains travel so slowly. High-speed rail is the very opposite of energy efficient. Electric high-speed trains travelling at 300 km/h+ are some of the worst energy guzzling machines we have.

The merit function for high-speed rail puts journey times and city centre to city centre connectivity as high priorities, far above energy efficiency, landscape preservation and flexibility.

For any pairing of cities that does not include London, this project is a bust. Yet the entire country is forced to pay for it.

What worked in Japan was a curious mix of ultra-high population density linked with a small number of population centres on flat plains.

In the UK, with its rolling countryside and older tracks, the 200 km/h tilting Advanced Passenger Train (APT) (although a victim of politics) was the only sensible choice. It exists today as the Pendolino, built under licence from Italian firms within the UK, but mostly abroad.

To create high-speed connectivity for the subset of passengers who require that option every day, the compound gyroplane is a very good choice. This can serve any two points within the UK in a maximum of two hours – not dissimilar to a stratosphere cruising jet, but without the need for expensive airport infrastructure. If the take-off areas are secure, then such a vehicle can even land on rooftops in the City of London.

The compound gyroplane would work for any and every type of person, in every area of the UK, while being a massive export earner and long-term job creation scheme.

The Fairey Rotodyne was an aircraft developed from 1956 to 1962 by the UK aeronautics company Fairey, later merged with Westland. It was a compound gyroplane with propellers and a large main rotor which was operated by “tipjets” – small combustion engines at the extremities of the rotor which provided a jet thrust to move the rotor for take off and landing. The main rotor itself was otherwise unpowered and it would freewheel in flight, providing lift.

This article examines the potential benefits of the craft in terms of providing an addition to the transport options in the United Kingdom. In order to assess these, it is important to engage in some analysis of existing transport modes and their benefits.

The physical geography of the United Kingdom is similar to Japan and New Zealand – a long, thin archipelago. However, the population distribution on the main island, Great Britain, does not lend itself to the construction of high-speed rail in anything but three operational axes which are economically viable. 

The high quality and high speed of the East Coast and West Coast mainlines mean that a good enough quality of travel can be obtained there. Going any faster than 140 mph (225 km/h) is not optimal, due to the energy use and increased cost.

A faster service could be obtained for the comparatively small number of customers who really need to go from London to Newcastle in under 1 hour by using helicopters or small aircraft. At a similar price point to the business class ticket on the high-speed rail system, there is a niche that can be met by use of a hybrid helicopter/aeroplane, which could thus also link the island of Ireland, Isle of Man, Isle of Wight, Scilly Isles, Inner and Outer Hebrides and Faroes. Charter services could perform multi-city stops and hops.

Travel options matrix

The variables we wish to examine are: speed, cost, capacity, energy efficiency and distance.

High-speed rail occupies a specific niche of the transport equation – high speed, high cost, low energy efficiency and medium capacity. The sweet spot for this mode is long distances between 150 and 600 km with large (100+) numbers of passengers.

Low-speed rail is low speed, relatively low cost, highly energy efficient and is almost always high capacity. The distance of this mode of travel is anywhere from 50km to 1000km. From 50+ passengers.

Minibus/coach travel is the lowest cost, highest capacity, low to medium speed, medium energy efficiency and very flexible. The distance of this mode of travel is anywhere from 50km to 1000km. 20+ people. Linking islands is only possible with the use of ferries.

Car travel is medium cost, medium speed, low capacity, low energy efficiency and the most flexible of all the ground transport options. The distance of this mode of travel is anywhere from 3km to 1000km. Linking islands is only possible with the use of ferries

Aeroplanes are the highest speed, high cost, inflexible and need long distances for the cost-benefit analysis to make sense. They are only efficient (in both terms of cost and energy) with very large numbers of people and somewhat medium to very long distances. Apart from flights from the South of England to Scotland, Ireland or the North of England, this is not a viable option for intra-UK travel.

Helicopters are the highest cost, most flexible form of transport in the UK, though of very low capacity and abysmal energy efficiency. More versatile in terms of places that can be reached and at speeds comparable with high-speed rail, they are nevertheless almost prohibitively expensive for anything but occasional use. They are not a commuting option.

Within this matrix, there exists an unmet niche: that of high speed, medium to high capacity, low to medium cost, with flexibility comparable to helicopters.

Enter the Rotodyne compound gyroplane.

Eric Matthew W. Masaba

Image: Rotodyne 2 by L. Chatfield, Flickr (CC by 2.0), cropped.

Should HS2 be converted into a road?

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Imagine the following nightmare scenario for HS2…

Phase One opens in 2033, around seven years later than originally planned, and tens of billions over budget.

To make matters worse, travel patterns have changed dramatically since High Speed 2 was first conceived. Routine business meetings now take place online, meaning demand for business travel has collapsed.

At the same time, a high proportion of professionals now work from home most of the week. They come into the office only occasionally and often avoid travelling during peak hours. The misery of long-distance rail commuting has largely been consigned to the past – at least for higher income groups.

HS2 still attracts a large number of passengers, though as with HS1, far fewer than forecast when the project was approved. The government has deliberately been slowing down services on the West Coast Main Line (WCML). As predicted, they have rigged the rail market to push more passengers onto the new route.

Competition is still a problem, however. Because few business travellers are using HS2, the vast majority of passengers are day-trippers, tourists, students and so on. They will switch to a slower journey on the WCML, the Chiltern Line, or even the coach if it saves them a few pounds. Inevitably this puts downward pressure on fares.

HS2 therefore faces financial disaster. Its construction was never going to be commercially viable, but it now requires heavy subsidies just to cover its operating costs.

And there are other clouds on the horizon. Driverless cars are finally being rolled out. While their top speed is lower, door-to-door journeys are often quicker than by HS2 – and far more convenient too, particularly for the elderly and those carrying luggage. The demand for rail is being further eroded.

HS2 has therefore become a major headache for ministers. They’ve already wasted tens of billions building the scheme and now it’s going to cost billions more to keep it running. In practice, this will mean cutting services on other parts of the network. After years of economic stagnation, the Treasury can no longer justify vast subsidies for the rail industry.

But there could be a solution.

Converting HS2 into a road has the potential to turn a heavily loss-making white elephant into a profitable business that could cover its operating costs and perhaps help to fill the financial black hole left by the project’s construction.

The government has claimed that up to 18 trains per hour, in each direction, could run along the southern section of HS2. Each train would carry up to 1,100 passengers. This amounts to roughly 20,000 passengers per hour. However, there is widespread scepticism that the planned frequency can be achieved in practice, particularly when many of the services are likely to experience delays on the legacy network before they join the new high-speed line.

Nevertheless, conversion into a road would massively increase potential capacity. Should the market demand it, the route could be managed to eliminate congestion and to maximise passenger numbers. Applying conservative assumptions, 600 coaches an hour, or one every six seconds, could carry 30,000 passengers an hour in each direction with 50 passengers per vehicle. (There are several real-world examples of busways achieving similar results). And obviously there would be relatively simple ways of increasing capacity further, for example by using driverless technology to reduce the gap between vehicles. A two-second gap – frequently observed already on motorways – equates to 1,800 vehicles per hour, or 90,000 passengers – around five times an optimistic figure for HS2.

As for journey times, it’s true that HS2 would reach a far higher top speed than the coaches. However, door-to-door journey times are what counts. The coaches would boast a far higher service frequency. Perhaps one would leave central Birmingham every minute. Better still, they could serve a much wider range of destinations, offering direct services into London and other places on or near the route from a large number of towns, villages and suburbs. Services could use the existing road network before joining and after leaving the former HS2. In this way, a far larger population could benefit directly from the new infrastructure.

Similarly, in London services could go to numerous destinations directly and wouldn’t have to terminate at Euston – perhaps continuing to the West End, City or Victoria Coach Station, for example. This in-built flexibility – which could also open up the route to shorter commuter journeys within the south-east – offers the potential of using the path of HS2 far more intensively than under existing plans.   

The shift in travel patterns detailed above suggests that an ultra-high-capacity route might not be needed. In this case, spare “slots” could be sold to cars and goods vehicles, raising additional revenue and taking pressure off the motorway network. A congestion-free road into central London could prove extremely valuable.

While it has not been possible to cover every aspect of railway conversion in this article (for more details and technical analysis, see the main Transport Watch website), the evidence suggests this option would provide higher capacity at significantly lower cost than HS2 – which would translate into lower fares and eliminate the need for operating subsidies. In addition, there would be major benefits from the greater flexibility to adapt to changing market conditions and new technologies. Finally, there could be significant environmental benefits, with lower top speeds translating into less noise and reduced energy consumption compared with HS2. (Given current policies, it is assumed that the road vehicles using the route would be electric by the mid-2030s).   

Going back to the situation in 2022, the best option remains cancellation of the entire High Speed 2 project. Even though billions have already been spent, the remaining budget would still deliver much higher returns if redeployed elsewhere (see the sunk-cost fallacy). Nevertheless, at some stage over the next few years Phase 1 of HS2 will hit the point of no return – not least due to the political embarrassment from abandoning it as it nears completion.    

When this happens, wouldn’t it make sense for ministers to reconsider the final trajectory of the scheme? Clearly it would be less costly to decide on the road option at a relatively early stage rather than installing a railway, and all its paraphernalia, only to rip it out a few years later.

Richard Wellings

Image: gov.uk

HS2 is not a cost-effective way of increasing rail capacity

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The government’s policies to increase rail capacity are looking increasingly foolish when Covid-19 is already leading to long-term changes in travel habits.

Office workers may choose to waste less time commuting and work a day or two each week from home. Business people will increasingly use video conferencing software rather than wasting the whole day travelling down to London for a routine meeting.

At the same time, the government’s finances are likely to be strained over the next few years. Rather than wasting roughly £100 billion on High Speed 2, policymakers should consider more cost effective ways of addressing rail capacity issues. This would be a far less reckless approach to spending taxpayers’ money than a horrendously risky megaproject that is already massively overbudget.

Here is a list of alternative measures. A big advantage is that unlike HS2, they can be implemented incrementally, specific to locations where they are practical and cost-effective, offering far more flexibility in the context of huge uncertainty over future passenger numbers.    

  • Introduce more flexible pricing to flatten the peak. Passengers would have greater financial incentives to travel during the “shoulders” of the peak, or indeed off-peak, thereby making more efficient use of existing infrastructure and rolling stock.
  • Phase out government subsidies and price controls so that fare levels better reflect industry costs.
  • Convert first class carriages into standard class carriages to accommodate more passengers.
  • Introduce high-capacity “economy class” coaches with more standing room instead of seating, offering lower fare options. (This is only likely to be a practical option post-Covid).
  • Lengthen trains by adding more carriages and extending platforms. Double-length trains could even be used on busier sections and then split part-way through the journey.
  • Deploy improved signalling technology to reduce the necessary gap between trains.
  • Consider using double-decker trains where the engineering costs would not be prohibitive.
  • Address bottlenecks by re-engineering junctions: relatively expensive but still much cheaper than building brand-new infrastructure.
  • Divert freight onto quieter routes, enhancing loading gauges where necessary. For example, intermodal traffic from Felixstowe to the Midlands and North can be sent via the Ipswich-Nuneaton route rather than the southern West Coast Main Line.
  • Allow full vertical integration to end the artificial separation between track and train, and between different franchisees and open-access operators. This should improve the financial incentives to make more efficient use of spare capacity.
  • Finally, in some locations there may be a strong economic case for lifting the railway tracks and converting the route into a busway or road, the former typically providing higher capacity at much lower cost than rail transport.

Richard Wellings

Image: Shutterstock

HS2 and the “Great Reset”

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High Speed 2 never made any economic sense. In commercial terms it was always going to make heavy losses. Ballooning budgets mean the costs are now likely to outweigh the benefits. And it’s crystal clear that alternative transport investments would deliver far higher returns.

So, why on earth is the project still going ahead?

One theory is that transport policy was captured by powerful special interests. Construction firms, train manufacturers and an army of consultants stand to cash-in from the scheme. They certainly haven’t been shy about lobbying MPs and ministers over the last few years.

Councils in the North and Midlands will use HS2 to grab yet more taxpayers’ cash to fund their pet “regeneration” projects around the new stations. No wonder they’re backing the line so strongly.

Then there are the senior bureaucrats. HS2 provides them with some of the best-paid jobs in government.

But there are compelling arguments against the special interests hypothesis. This is not to deny their influence on policy, but to question whether it is strong enough to be decisive.

Looking at political incentives, HS2 has been unpopular with the public, those against typically far outnumbering those in favour. The scheme has also been an endless source of embarrassment and bad publicity for successive governments, with numerous negative media stories on cost overruns, deception, incompetence, protests and the ill treatment of businesses and residents along the route.   

Having said this, the current government’s levelling-up agenda undoubtedly plays into the hands of the HS2 lobby. They could now argue that ministers were abandoning their pledges to boost the North should the line be cancelled or scaled back.

But earlier on, it would surely have made political sense to scrap HS2 and instead lavish the money on regeneration schemes in individual towns and cities across the region, including local transport upgrades. This would have been a quicker, more effective and less risky way of “buying” votes.

So, neither special interests nor political incentives seem to fully explain why HS2 is going ahead – which brings us to another possibility.

During the pandemic, awareness has grown about the so-called Great Reset agenda, often marketed by politicians as “Build Back Better”. This set of policies, promoted by transnational “elite” institutions such as the World Economic Forum and the European Commission, is being imposed across the Western bloc and its satellites.

At the heart of this shift is radical environmentalism – at least when taken at face value. In transport policy it translates into a ruthless war on drivers. This assault was ramped up in 2020 with the government paying councils to close large numbers of roads to through traffic and narrow main roads to install (often empty) cycle lanes.

Ministers also announced a ban on the sale of new petrol and diesel cars from 2030. The cost of electrification is likely to run into the high hundreds of billions, with motorists picking up much of the bill. The government is also considering introducing a national road pricing scheme, ostensibly to replace the vast revenues currently stolen from motorists via fuel duty.

It isn’t difficult to discern the direction of travel. Ordinary motorists will gradually be forced off the roads by a combination of regulation, tolls, taxes and closures. Driving (and also flying) will increasingly be the preserve of the rich.

So, how does this agenda relate to HS2?

At the moment a significant proportion of people travelling from the South East to the North or Midlands, or vice versa, choose to drive. Rail makes most sense for city centre to city centre journeys, particularly trips involving central London, which is car unfriendly to say the least. But if the journey starts and finishes in the suburbs, if other stops are planned en route, or if heavy luggage is carried, the car is often quicker and more convenient than the train.

However, if the Great Reset agenda is enforced, most people won’t have this choice in fifteen or twenty years’ time.

Imagine someone driving from Yorkshire to London in the not-so-distant future. He struggled to afford an expensive electric car and rapid charging socket, and is saving up for the eventual battery replacement.

He incurs heavy tolls as the government tracks his drive south. On entering London, the surveillance system levies an additional hefty “congestion charge” tax. He’s then delayed by 20 mph speed limits, cycle lanes, road humps and chicanes. The route he used to take is no longer possible due to road closures and he has to make a long detour.

On arriving at his destination he struggles to find a parking space. One side of the road has been turned into a cycle lane and the other is permits only. When he finally finds one, the charge is prohibitive. He decides that he won’t bother driving next time. He will use video conferencing or if absolutely necessary take the train.

So, the transport market is going to be so heavily rigged that most people will have little choice but to travel by rail if they make these kind of journeys – assuming they can afford it (these policies are likely to bring a major reduction in overall personal mobility, with negative knock-on effects on job opportunities, business costs, productivity and wages).

This authoritarian agenda may explain politicians’ attachment to HS2. Senior officials and ministers have been aware of and signed up to Great Reset-type policies for years. They knew a big crackdown on private motoring was coming and were just waiting for a pretext to impose it. In the meantime, the true scale of the shift and its implications would deliberately be hidden from the public.

HS2 will prove very useful to government ministers during the coming assault on private transport and mobility. They will deploy it to deceive the public that they are speeding up journeys and improving connectivity when for the vast majority of travellers the exact opposite is true.

It is no coincidence that the EU, together with the UK and US governments, are all now promoting uneconomic high-speed rail and very similar transport policies more generally. This is a top-down agenda, ordered by an unaccountable transnational “elite” and imposed by its lackeys in national governments. Both liberty and democracy are being crushed in the process.

Opposing this railway is therefore about far more than saving taxpayers’ money, protecting private property and halting environmental destruction. If HS2 is stopped, or even scaled back, our leaders will find it harder to undermine people’s freedom to travel.

Richard Wellings