The scandal of the railways, part 2

This post provides the abstract to Part 2 of our paper Better User of Railways, the first of which formed the background to the IEA publication “Paving over the Tracks” February 2015. Parts 1 and 2 are both here .

The height of Government fantasy is represented by the Greenwash diagrams taken from Cm 7996: Creating Growth, Cutting Carbon – Making Sustainable Local Transport Happen Jamuary 2014. The diagrams are at pages 23 and 24 within the Website copy of the full Part 2.


“Abstract and a question.

This note provides snapshots from the dawn of the railway age to the present (2013), touching the week of terror, 1847, Black Friday, 1866, railway closures since the Great War, early ring roads for London, the ever rising losses on the railways, the endless presumption that profit was just round the corner, contrary views, (Brigadier’ Lloyd’s seminal paper of 1955, Stewart Joy’s book, “The train that ran away”, the Hall smith report of 1976, “Better use of Rail Ways”), Beeching, Serpell, the endless white papers, the Prescott plans (better for everyone) perhaps a thousand bullet points; all against the background of the rail’s share falling to 1.7% of passenger journeys before rising to today’s trivial 3%, representing a slightly less trivial 8.7% of passenger-miles, along with 8.5% of tonne-miles.

• Endless policy statements in defiance of the numbers – declaring for ever and a day that rail is essential to the nation, that congestion can be solved by investing in pubic transport (a mode carrying only 12% of passenger miles), despite the obvious impossibility of buses, let alone trains serving the dispersed land-use enabled by the car.
• Unreality reaches new levels with cartoons illustrating how, in 2011, Whitehall envisaged the future. “Anytown” and “Anyvillage” are magic places from which the car has vanished in favour of the bus, cycle lanes, railway stations, travel plans tempting us to walk and bicycle sheds, let alone the green paint.
• High speed rail in defiance of Sir Rod Eddington’s careful analysis – as always, a wilful disregard for the numbers

We make no apology for repetition since the history is one and the same; an endless sequence of doing the same as yesterday while expecting a different result.

We do not analyse the reasons believing them to be self-evident and institutional, namely vested interests on a grand scale coupled with subsidy, running to hundreds of billions of pounds. That has perpetuated a system which would, under market forces, vanish overnight, see Part 1.

But first we ask a question. Is it all an historical accident?

Had the technology of tar and bitumen Macadam, road building and the pneumatic tyre existed in 1825, the dawn of the railway age, would the railways ever have existed? As it was it seemed obvious that the only way to drag large loads was on steel or iron tracks secured by cross pieces and to the ground below. However there were penalties. For reasonable speed, the track had to be laid to a very high tolerance and maintained at that tolerance. The stopping distances, and hence headways for the very heavy vehicles had to be large. (Today the distances used in design are about four times as great as required for roads). The vehicles lacked manoeuvrability; a broken down train could not be simply pushed to one side as can a road vehicle, and is much more difficult to rescue due to access problems. No other vehicles could use the track and the trains could not leave it.

Once these superb rights of way were paved with railway lines it became impossible, or at least impossible in imagination, to remove the steel in favour of the far more efficient and less costly road surface. Reason was blighted by the seeming order, imagined efficiency and the beauty of a pair of railway tracks curving away in the distance, gleaming in the morning sun, even though the pair would generally be empty of trains. It was as though, having gone down one evolutionary path, it was impossibly for the beast to evolve as it might otherwise have.

In reality that inflexibility grew out of vested interest and because of the dead hand of Government subsidy. The railway lobby had enormous influence in Parliament. Consequently the decades which followed were, as noted above, a catalogue of doing today what was done yesterday, in defiance of the numbers, and expecting a different result.

If instead there had been a fiat to the effect that land already committed to transport should be retained in that use for the good of the community as a whole, whilst denying subsidy, the market and financial realism would have driven the network owners to make the only sensible decision. That would be to pave the railways. The rights of way would then have been immensely profitable, as are the roads where tax-take far exceeds expenditure. Furthermore all those crushed London surface rail commuters would have seats at fraction of the rail fares they now suffer.

The value of the opportunity lost is beyond calculation, a dreadful indictment of Government interference in the market. Remember, even in the peak hour, in highway terms London’s vast, often grade-separated rail network, is substantially disused, see Part 1 and Topic 15.

The scandal of the railways, part 1

The IEA publication “Paving over the Tracks” highlights the opportunity lost by preserving the railway as a railway. The background analysis supporting that is here. The critics, mostly from the railway lobby, illustrate the scandal that the railways have been for over half a century. Here are the facts, none of which are our fault.

A double track railway offers 7.3 metres between tunnel and viaduct walls, the same width as the carriageway of a two-way trunk road, and 8.5 metres elsewhere. It is not our fault that roads built on such railway alignments would be vastly superior to the tarmacked cow trails which so often double as A-roads in the UK. Likewise it is not our fault that the widths are vast on the approaches to towns and cities. Despite that the railway lobby persist in the notion that the rights of way are “too narrow”. In the 1960s a Permanent Under-Secretary told his Minister that it was “impossible” to make a road from a railway because it was , “too straight and too level”, for heaven’s sake.

A contra-flow express coach lane in New York 11 feet wide offers 30,000 seats in the peak hour whilst the trains carrying 30,000 crushed passengers into Victoria Main line require four inbound tracks. Despite that Bombardier scandalously told the Transport Committee’s inquiry into the Future of the Railway, 2003-2004 that, “to carry 50,000 people per hour in one direction we need: a 175 metre road used by cars, or a 35 metre road used by buses or a 9 metre bed for a metro or commuter railway”. Likewise Professor Begg, DfT Staff and others are prepared to mislead Ministers and the Secretary of State by saying that HS2 will have the same capacity as a 12-lane motorway when, in fact, one lane of such a road may, if dedicated to express coaches, have four times the seating capacity of HS2.

• It is not our fault that, if London’s vast grade- separated rail network were paved, all those crushed peak-hour surface rail commuters would find seats in express coaches sufficient to fill only one seventh of the capacity available at a fraction the fare, nor is it our fault that, averaged over the network, Rail carries half as much per track-km as does the strategic road system per lane-km.

The plain fact is that the rail function could be discharged by a daily flow as low as 450 express coaches plus lorries per day per track, averaged over the network, a flow so low it would be imperceptible in one lane of a motor road. Yet this vast clunking network serves the hearts of our towns and cities.

Dividing costs to Government by passenger-miles or tonne-miles provides unit costs by rail which are five to seven times higher than the comparable costs by road.

And. Oh gosh! the replacement Express coaches and lorries would use 30% less energy than the trains, while emitting less carbon. Furthermore there would be an immense additional saving in fuel and emissions from the tens of thousands of other vehicles which could divert from the unsuitable roads and city streets which they now clog. Nevertheless the Railway lobby, in defiance of the facts, persists in presenting Rail as though it were uniquely “green”.

Amazingly the arithmetic shows that when deaths by rail, including trespassers but not suicides, are divided by passenger-miles, the death rate is higher than the corresponding value for the strategic road network. Meanwhile the railway lobby exaggerates in favour of rail by a factor of around 400 by citing statistics which ignore usage and which confine rail deaths to those killed as passengers in Train Accidents, deaths which amount to less than 5% of all those killed on the network.

A sensible budget for converting the national rail system to a system of reserved motor roads is £20bn – a mere peanut compared with the anticipated expenditure on national rail for the decade to 2018/19, namely, £89bn including finance charges or £76bn excluding those charges. Till income for the decade is only circa £24bn (thats the income to Netwrk Rail, not the fares income to the TOCs). Hence the implied subsidy is £65bn (where the data excludes Cross rail and HS2).

• In comparison to that vast expenditure on rail, perhaps £30bn will be spent on the strategic road network over the decade but the tax take may exceed £170bn.

In short, rail commuters travelling in crushed conditions to London terminals on week-day mornings will be dismayed to know that, if the railways were not a kind of religion, they would all be seated and at a fraction of the cost of the train; that in Central London and in the peak hour, our immense, clunking rail network is, in highway terms, used to perhaps one seventh of its capacity if paved; that even in tunnels a double-track railway offers a right of way the same width as the carriageway of a two-way trunk road; that if the rails were removed in favour of asphalt, productivity would increase by a factor of two to three; that the replacement express coaches would match the train for journey times (except for the longest 10% of journeys); that subsidy would be turned to profit; that countless lorries and other vehicles would divert from the unsuitable rural roads and city streets which they now clog; that energy consumption and emissions would be reduced; that deaths would be reduced and that endless acres of derelict railway land would become intensely valuable.

The reason for this scandalous state of affairs is that the railway lobby, and all those train spotters, have indeed succeeded in elevating rail to a kind of religion, failing only because of man’s failure and quite beyond reason.

Truth is that the system passed its sell-by date in 1945. Consequently we now have a fully modernised transport museum pretending to be a transport system at great inconvenience and cost to rail commuters and to the nation as a whole.

From our archive at item 25, in topic 6, we have Frances Cairncross, when Economics Correspondent for The Guardian, cited as writing, on 29 April 1974 that, “when trains are still the theme of nursery rhymes and children’s stories, it is small wonder that the railways have a romantic fascination for most adults. Only years of nursery conditioning can explain the calm with which the public has accepted a bill of £3,000 millions (£37bn at 2014 prices) to subsidise British Rail over the last decade …”. The pity is that it is the same today but with one difference namely, subsidy for decades to 2018/19 is likely to be £65bn, not counting Crossrail and HS2. So, real progress there then.

Scalextric roads, for heaven’s sake

In today’s Times (23rd January 2015) there is an item reporting that the Highways Agency “is testing the feasibility of installing wireless technology beneath roads which would charge electric and hybrid cars on the go”- so called “scalextric roads”. The study is to cost £200,000 and to be completed by the summer before progressing to full off road trials, for heavens sake..

We can only wring our hands at the folly of the thing.

Ours at second below, and at topic 32 in our web site, shows that the electric car emits as much or more carbon than does a diesel. Likewise, ours immediately below shows that the effect on health of particulates from road traffic is likely to be between zero and negligible.

The cost of this “Scalextric” proposal would be overwhelming, or as Professor Glaister, of the RAC Foundation, puts it, “enormous”.

Leave politicians with a free hand and there is no end to the ways in which they will spend other people’s money. At the same time one does wonder at the integrity of the Engineering profession. Rather than telling politicians the truth we Engineers seem content do or say anything, provided a decent fee, or a vast salary, is guaranteed…….. HS2 springs to mind.

The great dirty diesel scare

UPDATED February 2015 File Ref. The Great Dirty Diesel Scare 03

The media headline, that man-made air pollution causes “29,000 premature deaths” in the UK is from a report, dated 2010, by the Committee on the Medical Effects of Air Pollutants, COMEAP. The snazzy title is The Mortality Effects of Long-Term Exposure to Particulate Air Pollution in the United Kingdom. The report runs to 98 pages. Paragraph 2 of the Executive summary provides:

  • At sub-para (a): “The current (2008) burden of anthropogenic particulate matter air pollution is, with some simplifying assumptions, an effect on mortality in 2008 equivalent to nearly 29,000 deaths in the UK at typical ages and an associated loss of total population life of 340,000 life-years. The burden can also be represented as a loss of life expectancy from birth of approximately six months”.
  • At sub-para (d): “The uncertainties in these estimates need to be recognised: they could vary from about a sixth to double the figures shown”

However:

(1) The range cited represents “75% plausibility limits”. Had the more usual 95% limits been used they would have embraced zero, meaning that, in statistical terms, the forecast shortening in life expectance due to particulates is no different from zero

(2) The saving may be achieved only if all man-made particulates are eliminated

(3) Only about one tenth of man-made particulates are from road traffic. Separately from the report, COMEAP say that removing all particles attributable to local traffic may increase average life-expectancy by approximately 16 days for England and Wales and approximately 41 days in Inner London.

Furthermore, the computation and assumptions underlying the data are opaque. The report refers to an earlier report with the title, “Long-Term Exposure to Air Pollution: Effect on Mortality”, published in 2009, 186 pages. That report refers to “Relative Risk” coefficients derived from the “American Cancer Society (ACS) study (Pope et al, 1995, 2002)”. COMEAP uses those coefficients, together with other sources, to compute the changes in life expectancy. However, the complexity and opacity of the whole undermines confidence. Indeed common sense suggests that it may be nigh on impossible to isolate the effects of particulates from the other factors.

Additionally, many of the estimates and error ranges depend on “eliciting” from “experts” their views. That process, known as elicitation, is heavily criticised by Professor P. K. Hopke in the earlier COMEAP report, “Long-term Exposure to Air Pollution: Effect on Mortality”, cited above.

There is also a critique of the ACS paper by Joel Schwartz, Adjunct Scholar of the Competitive Enterprise Institute. The executive summary, available here, makes compelling reading. It suggests that the ACS paper is deeply flawed and that, probably, particulates have no effect whatsoever on lifespan. That conclusion is consistent with the COMEAP findings, where, at section 3.1.3, risk coefficients range from unity to 1.15. A value of unity implies that particulates have no effect.

Conclusion

The data from COMEAP suggests trivial average life expectancy gains from banning all diesel vehicles. The plausibility limits on those gains are extraordinarily wide. The basis for the numbers is opaque. Some have argued the American ACS study, upon which the whole depends, is junk science. In truth these particulates may very well have no effect on lifespan whatsoever.

For those reasons it seems that the present attack on the diesel vehicle has no solid basis.

Paul Withrington

The zero emission electric car

The following was published in the professional magazine Local Transport Today (issue 665 dated 5th September 2014). It tells the story of our failed complaint against an advertisement claiming zero carbon dioxide emissions from the Renault Zoe electric car.

Ref, LTT 89 electric cars ASA letter 01

THE ZERO EMISSIONS ELECTRIC CAR.

In May of last year Transport-Watch lodged a complaint against an advert placed by Renault which claimed that the official fuel consumption for the Renault Zoe range of electric cars was “not available” and that the official CO2 emissions were zero, but (strangely) that the latter may vary according to driving conditions.

Both claims seem ludicrous since the electricity consumption is known along with the carbon emission per kW hour of power supplied. Hence, we were astonished when our complaint was summarily rejected within about a week. We then pointed out that a similar advert by BMW, placed in 2010, had suffered a similar complaint and that ASA had told BMW not to repeat the zero emission claim.

It took ASA a year to respond, but when it did it again rejected our complaint, concluding with the words: “We investigated the ad under CAP Code (Edition 12) rules 3.1 and 3.3 (Misleading advertising), 3.9 (Qualification), 11.1, 11.4 and 11.7 (Environmental claims), but did not find it in breach”. Well, here is what the guidance says:-

3.1: Marketing communications must not materially mislead or be likely to do so.
3.3: Marketing communications must not mislead the consumer by omitting material.
3.9: Marketing communications must state significant limitations and qualifications.
11.1: The basis of environmental claims must be clear. Unqualified claims could mislead if they omit significant information.
11.4 Marketers must base environmental claims on the full life cycle of the advertised product, unless the marketing communication states otherwise, and must make clear the limits of the life cycle. If a general claim cannot be justified, a more limited claim about specific aspects of a product might be justifiable. Marketers must ensure claims that are based on only part of the advertised product’s life cycle do not mislead consumers about the product’s total environmental impact.
11.7: Marketing communications must not mislead consumers about the environmental benefit etc.

We were bemused. It could not be more obvious that a claim of zero emissions breaks every one of those guidelines. Hence we appealed. In that appeal we showed that the energy burnt in power stations and used to power the ZOE car provided a fuel consumption equivalent to only 56 miles per gallon and that the carbon emission amounted to 79 gms of CO2 per km, if the energy used in battery manufacture is ignored, and to 118 gms if the latter is taken into account. We compared that with advertised data for the Peugeot 108. After increasing the fuel consumption and carbon emission by 10%, to allow for refinery and distribution losses, that vehicle returns 60mpg and emits 109gms of CO2 per km.

At that point that it seemed obvious to us that no one could deny us the appeal. How wrong we were. Instead the independent adjudicator, in the form of Sir Hayden Phillips GCB DL, wrote that ASA had acted entirely properly and within the legal framework. Among other he provides;

“I see from your review request that you attached an email response from the VCA which says: “Following the 2013 amendment to the regulation, it became necessary to display the CO2 and fuel consumption figures for all vehicles – including electric vehicles, albeit that the results will be ‘0’ for CO2 emissions and ‘N/A’ (not applicable) for fuel consumption”. The advertisement you complain of follows this guidance precisely and I cannot see how you can reasonably expect the ASA not to follow the guidance of the responsible authority in this area. For them not to have done so could well have been a substantial flaw; but to do so was both defensible and reasonable and therefore not flawed”.

The fact that the VCA Guidelines are (a) not binding (its introduction says that “It is not offered as an authoritative legal interpretation of the meaning of the Regulations”) and (b) are in contradiction to the engineering reality, ASA’s own guidance and to similar guidance in the Green Claims Code published by DEFRA and BIS, the UK Code of Broadcast Advertising (BCAP Code) and the International Standard, ISO 14021:5.7h did not carry any weight. Instead Sir Hayden stood firmly behind the non-binding VCA guidance, a stance which we find incredible.

We conclude that ASA and the adjudicator are not fit for purpose. At any rate it is clear that this extraordinarily misleading advert will continue until someone in high places forces the VCA to bring its guidelines into line with reality, or the ASA decided that its own guidance trumps the ludicrous guidance published by the VCA.

Alternatively, could it be that (a) the ASA lacks scientists or (b) the adjudicator should be one in such cases or (c) the issue is in the grip of politics and vested interests, such as car manufacturers paid to promote electric cars on the contested premise that they will reduce carbon emissions?

More detail about this extraordinary matter is at topic 32 in the Transport-Watch web site.

Paul Withrington

 

HS2 and construction inflation, part two

This follows from Beleben’s post of 28th May reproduced below.
……………………..
Our Facts Sheet 6, updated January 2012, provides:

This facts sheet was first produced in August 2002. The update is the same as the original except for minor typographical changes and the addition of the latest cost of for the West Coast Main Line Modernisation Programme.

1. At privatization in 1994 the British Rail forecast for track maintenance beyond 2001 was £774 million per year (source, page 11 of the prospectus issued in advance of sale). At 1999 prices that amounts to £0.888 billion.
2. In contrast the network management statement for the years 1996/7 and 2000 provide an annual average for the 10 years 1995/6 to 2005/6 at 1999 prices of £2 billion per year. The 2001 network statement provides an average of nearly £3 billion per year at the 2001/02 price base for the five years 2001/2 to 2005/6. Thereafter the cost is forecast to taper off to £2.2 billion in 2010/11.The increase from £0.888 bn to nearly 3 billion, a factor of over 3 is typical of the appalling record the rail industry has for estimating its costs. Other illustrations follow at 3, 4 and 5 below.
3. The West Coast Main Line Modernisation Programme was to cost £2.35 billion in 1997, £2.95 billion in March 1999, £4.75 billion in October 1999, £5.56 billion in January 2000 and £5.8 billion at the start of the Public Inquiry in February 2001. (Source is the Overview Paper produced in May 2000 and a report to the Rail Regulator by Booz-Allen and Hamilton dated June 2000). The price rose to £6.3 billion during the inquiry when there were press reports that it would cost £9 billion. By August 2002 the press was reporting £13 billion, but that was cut to £10 billion after the Regulator struck out enhancements otherwise required for the originally proposed 150 mph speeds. That was reduced to £7.3 billion only to rise to £10 billion as reported today, January 2012.
4. An old cost for the Train Protection System is £1 billion but that rose to £6 billion according to the press but the number is now quoted as £3.8 billion.
5. Meanwhile the overall cost of Railtrack’s original nation-wide Modernisation Programme rose from £50 billion through £60 billion to a projected £73 billion – Sufficient to build the residential accommodation for a city of 1.5 million people. Where that programme now stands is not clear.

The original cost estimates misled the Government and shareholders into commitments which may never have been considered if the actual costs had been available. Possibly these massive cost failures are deliberate. In any case they are mirrored by equally massive misrepresentations to do with capacity, safety and other issues, see other facts sheets.

beleben's avatarbeleben

The June 2008 Railnews report “What future for high speed rail in Britain?” gave Greengauge 21’s estimate of the cost of a 177 km high speed railway from London to Birmingham as £7.1 billion, at 2007 prices.

2008 Greengauge 21 estimate for a London - Birmingham high speed line2008 Greengauge 21 estimate for a London – Birmingham high speed line

The 2014 David Higgins HS2 Plus report stated that the government’s ~225 km HS2 phase one proposal was costed at £19.4 billion (P50 estimate, at 2011 prices). However, that does not appear to take account of Camden and Birmingham council aspirations for ‘high quality’ station developments, or the possible effects of “alliancing” on project delivery. Alliancing, an anti-competitive-anti-SME approach favoured by Network Rail, could add £1 billion or more to phase one costs.

Railnews, 2008: Birmingham Chamber cast doubt on the value of HS2Railnews, 2008

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The incredible cost of HS2 and of rail

Beleben’s post, “HS2 and construction inflation”, dated 22nd May 2014 provides the cost of the Great Central Line, built at the end of the 19th C, as £11.5 million for 153 route-km yielding £75,000 per km. A multiplier of 110 converts to current prices, providing £8.25 million per km. In comparison HS2 to Leeds and Manchester would provide 531 route-km at a cost of £42.6 billion, equivalent to £80 million per route-km; nearly ten times that of the GCL.

We go on to point out that the cost of a dual three-lane motorway is circa £20 million per km or £3.3 million per lane-km. That is 12 times less than HS2’s £40 million per track-km. Meanwhile a single motorway lane dedicated to 75-seat express coaches has four times the capacity of HS2′s supposed eighteen 1,000-seat trains per hour…….

Of course an urban motorway would cost more than the value cited above, but the way to create such facilities at a fraction of the cost of new construction is to pave the railways and to manage the resultant network to avoid congestion. Estimates based on actual conversions, available in Facts Sheet 12 of the Transport-Watch web site, suggest a conversion cost of circa £500,000 per lane or track-km or circa one sixth of new motorway construction costs.

“Do not be silly”, I hear you say, “How would London’s rail commuters get there if the railway were converted to a road”?

Well, in central London, and at peak times, the replacement express coaches would occupy only one seventh of the capacity available if the railway were paved, see topic 15 at http://www.Transport-Watch.co.uk where there is a map and some pictures to enjoy. Alternatively peg through the following and miss the map and pictures.

250,000 crushed surface rail passengers enter the centre of London in the morning peak hour. There are at least 25 pairs of tracks. Hence we have 10,000 passengers per inbound track. The 10,000 would all find seats in 150 75-seat coaches, sufficient to occupy one seventh of the capacity of one lane of a motor road the same width as required by a train. (1, 000 coaches per hour at a speed of 100 kph would have average headways of 100 metres).

Furthermore, for all but the longest journeys the express coach would match rail for journey time, while costing perhaps four times less and using a fraction of the fuel. Additionally countless lorries and other vehicles would transfer from the unsuitable rural roads and city streets which they now clog and the endless acres of nearly derelict railway land which abuts so many of our stations would become intensely valuable.

Baroness Kramer makes a pig’s ear

Baroness Kramer, Minister of State for Transport, gave the key note speech on 20th May at the Infrarail exhibition held at Earls Court Exhibition Centre over the three days ending to 22nd. I asked the second question, as follows:

(1)   It was jolly good that HS2 would generate 100,000 jobs but the cost would amount to a fantastic £500,000 per job. How many would that vast subsidy destroy in that part of the economy which makes a profit?

(2)   Did the Baroness know that it cost the government seven times as much to move a passenger or tonne of freight by rail as it does by road?

(3)   Did she understand that the product of that vast expenditure provides only 3% of passenger journeys, 7.5% of passenger-miles and 8.5% of tonne-miles?

The Baroness replied by saying she did not recognise the railway I described, which is a pity because that is how it is.

The assembled multitude cheered, but I was congratulated privately.

Perhaps the problem is that, in the words of Upton Sinclair, “It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends upon his not understanding it”.

Paul Withrington