The following was published as our “Viewpoint” in Local Transport Today on 15th April 2016. 

(Text as published available at topic 35 of the Transport-watch web site).

Professor James R Flynn, author of Are We Getting Smarter – Rising IQ in the Twenty-First Century, shows that there has been an IQ gain of circa three points per decade for nearly 100 years, implying that we are all now raving geniuses compared with our ancestors. One reason for this astonishing trend is that habits of thought have changed. Previously they were rooted in the real, or concrete, world. Today people think in logical terms, at least for some of the time. To illustrate, Flynn cites a question and answer conversation with an isolated peasant people in the 1920s, whose economy depended on camels:

Q: There are no camels in Germany. Berlin is in Germany. So, how many camels are there in Berlin?
A: I do not know. I have never seen a German village. If Berlin is a large city there should be camels there.
Q: But what if there aren’t any in all of Germany?
A: If Berlin is a village there is probably no room for camels.

The naive conclusion may be that the peasants had an IQ of around 50. However, do we sophisticates fail to apply our intelligence when faced with data that contradicts our deeply-held prejudices?

Consider the emerging transport policy for the Northern Powerhouse. The region has great cities such as York, Leeds and Manchester, connected by two distinct and separate transport systems, rail and road. In an attempt to sabotage sentiment we will call these Mode-A (rail) and Mode-B (road).

Mode-A has highly engineered rights of way penetrating to the hearts of towns and cities. However, the track and vehicle costs are extraordinarily high compared with those for Mode B. Worse still, the vehicles are captive to the tracks. This system is revered because of the heroic engineering involved, the beauty of a pair of empty rail tracks curving away in the morning sun and because of the sentiment generated by a steam engine. However, Mode-A carries less than two percent of the region’s passenger-journeys, at vast cost to the benighted taxpayers despite astronomically expensive fares.

Mode-B, has a longer lineage, although only recently modernised to the extent of the asphalt and the motorised carriage. It costs the taxpayer seven times less per passenger-mile than does Mode-A, carries 98% of the region’s passenger-journeys and yields taxes far in excess of expenditure. Furthermore, Mode-B is so popular that demand frequently exceeds capacity, causing congestion, a matter that could be solved by pricing. Against this background, councillors, MPs and other doyens asked themselves and the populace which system should attract the most funding. Astonishingly, and despite the region being the birthplace of the logic-based industrial revolution, if not the age of reason, it was Mode-A that, to much applause, won the day. Here is a list of the aspirational schemes taken from a DfT news release (‘Revolutionary plans for northern transport set out’ 20 Mar 2015).

Major (Mode-A) options for new routes:
• Leeds to Newcastle: £8.5bn to £14.0bn
• Sheffield to Manchester: £12bn to £19bn
• Manchester to Leeds: £6.5bn to £10.0bn
• Liverpool to Manchester: £8.0bn to £13.0bn
• Leeds to Hull £5.5bn to £9bn

Mid-range total: £52.6bn. The reference also lists “Upgrades and cut-offs” (possibly substitutional to the above) with a mid-range price tag of £17.7bn.

These vast sums compare with a paltry £4.8bn for major schemes on the strategic routes associated with Mode-B for the six years to 2020/21.To appreciate the lunacy, note that, nationwide, the strategic element of the Mode-B network is two to three times as productive per lane-km as is Mode-A per track-km (Transport-Watch factsheet 1), and six to seven times as productive in terms of Government expenditure (see the spreadsheet associated with Transport-Watch topic 2).

Such things point to the lunatic. As an example of how warped some “thinking” is, we have the revered Stephen Joseph, of the railway lobby group, the Campaign for Better Transport (itself originally funded by the railway unions), who, in his letter of 21 January, attacks the case for a Trans-Pennine road tunnel on the basis that its (obvious) benefits are not proven. He apparently forgets that the Trans-Pennine railway carries less than one tenth of the passengers on the parallel M62. Presumably Joseph simply cannot imagine a world without railways any more than the peasants could imagine one without camels.

Likewise, in topics such as traffic management, speed cameras, electric cars, and the great dirty diesel scare (Transport-Watch topics 9, 12, 32 and 34). In all these areas logic has vanished in the face of prejudice and ignorance; similarly the scandal of HS2 (topic 15).

So, with a nod toward those peasants and their problem with the camels, we acknowledge that, for the time being, IQ has deserted transport policy. It’s not the steel tyres or the tracks that generate economic activity. Instead it’s the provision of moving floor space. Despite the prejudice, the express coach and lorry provide that at a fraction the cost of the train.

When sentiment, nostalgia and vested interest are rolled out, rational debate ends. Alternatively, do we conclude that we suffer from chronic intellectual corruption, evidenced by consultants and officials who are prepared to cynically accept the rewards of high office in return for the unpalatable task of tricking the Government on a mammoth scale? Perhaps it’s both.

As Alexander Pope wrote in the Dunciad, published 1742, ‘Dulness o’er all possess’d her ancient right, Daughter of Chaos and eternal Night.’

The October 2013 analysis claims benefits from the Wider Economic Impacts of 4.2bn for Phase 1 and 13.3bn for the full network.

However, no allowance has been made for the hit the economy may take in funding this £50bn to £80bn scheme. To appreciate the scale of that, note that HS2 claim the scheme will generate 100,000 jobs, although many of those may be relocations. Then note that the actuarial cost at the 2011 price base faced by those standing in 2033 will be close to £70 billion, see press release 4. It follows that the cost per job to the taxpayer will be £700,000. How many will that vast subsidy destroy in that part of the economy which makes a profit void of subsidy?

In parallel to that there is the extraordinary KMPG report on the Regional Impacts of HS2, Dated September 2013; principle authors, Lewis Atter and Richard Threlfall. That report claims the scheme will generate benefits worth £15bn annually.

The supposed £15bn can only arise from the generated business plus commuter trips, the supply side, since most of the benefits from existing trips obviously pre-exist. Forecast generated trips amount to 76,900 per weekday, equivalent to 24 million per year. Data for Virgin West Coast from the National Rail Passenger Survey suggests 35% may be commuting or on business. Hence, if the £15bn is to be believed, each of these generated business-plus- commuter trips would be worth £1,860 or over £3,700 for a round trip.

To appreciate how absurd that is first note that these are generated trips. Pre-existing ones would be more valuable (perhaps twice as valuable if the same principles are applied as are applied to time values). Secondly, multiply the £1,860 by all national rail’s commuter plus business trips. They number roughly 51% of Network Rail’s 1.6bn passenger rail journeys. The sum provides £1,500 billion, a value which is similar to the nation’s entire GDP!

If only that were true. Building a railway would then equate to undreamed of riches.

Paul Withrington, director of Transport Watch comments:

“Why was any air time at all given to Lewis Atter and Richard Threlfall by either the Transport Committee of the House of Commons or the Economic Affairs Committee of the House of Lords? The claim made by this KPMG report is, at a glance, ludicrous.”

“This scheme, if built, will be a millstone round the nation’s neck for generations, sucking on subsidy for ever, whilst nobody will dare to say that we would do better to dig it up.”

For more details, or to arrange an interview, please contact Paul Withrington on 01604 847438 or pwith@transport-watch.co.uk and open topic 17.

About Transport Watch
Transport Watch is an independent think tank founded in October 2002. Our objective is to become the non-governmental point of reference for factual data dealing with transport generally and road and rail in particular. For full details visit: http://www.transport-watch.co.uk/

The January 2012 and October 2013 economic analyses provide very similar benefit to cost ratios.

That is remarkable. After all, the value of business time was reduced by 32%, from £47.12 per hour to £31.96 per hour, the passenger forecasts were reduced by 15% and the net costs to government at the were increased by 24% for Phase 1 and by 26% for the full network.

Had those changes been simply substituted into the January 2012 study the economic case would have collapsed. Instead, and remarkably, the new study produced benefit to cost ratios which are almost identical to those in the old study.

There are at least two reasons for that.

• The first is that the percentage on business was inflated to 40%, far above the 30% suggested by survey data and far above the percentages used previously (26% for Phase 1 and 29% for the full network).
• The second is obscure. In the earlier study the values of time associated with crowding and interchange for business passengers was the same as commuter time, namely £6.46per hour. In the later study business time, then valued at £31.96 per hour, was used for those items. That alone generated benefits of circa £3bn for Phase 1 and £6.6bn for the full network.

Additionally, we find that those two unjustified changes are inadequate to rescue the scheme – substitution into the 2012 analysis produces stubbornly low benefit to cost ratios (1.24 for phase 1 and ranging from 1.4 to 1.6 for the full network, void of the contentious Wider Economic Benefits). Hence we suspect some other sleight of hand.

As things stand the original benefit to cost ratios would be rescued only if the above changes are admitted and if the percentage on business were to be inflated to 50% and above.

For those reasons we say that this analysis has been shamefully manipulated so as to obtain “the right answer” in defiance of the data.
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Paul Withrington, director of Transport Watch comments:
“The economic analysis is based on a system enabling almost any tune to be played. Tweak this or that and huge changes arise. The tune selected by HS 2Ltd is a Honky- tonk. It should be switched off and HS2 abandoned immediately”

For more details, or to arrange an interview, please contact Paul Withrington on 01604 847438 or pwith@transport-watch.co.uk and open topic 17.

About Transport Watch
Transport Watch is an independent think tank founded in October 2002. Our objective is to become the non-governmental point of reference for factual data dealing with transport generally and road and rail in particular. For full details visit: http://www.transport-watch.co.uk/

Cost benefit analysis was first conceived for evaluating road schemes where, in the absence of road pricing, or tolls, there is no direct market. The original procedure compared the resource costs with the cash value of time and accident savings plus the savings in vehicle operating costs. All transfer payments, such as taxes, were excluded. The rational was that cash transfers do not create or absorb resources. A similar procedure has been adopted for the railways but with two key differences.

Firstly, railways sell a product. Hence there is a market. In a sane world decisions would be made on a financial basis, namely, if it makes a loss, let alone a loss in the tens of billions of pounds, do not build it. However, if that were the case no railway scheme would ever see the light of day. All of them require massive subsidy from the taxpayer.

Secondly, instead of comparing the cost of the resources used with the social benefits, the comparison is between the “cost to Government” and those social benefits – the so called “Willingness to Pay Calculus”, proposed by Professor Sugden of the University of East Anglia.
Under that dispensation and for HS2 the cost to Government is the capital plus future operating and maintenance costs minus the so called incremental fares – the fares taken by HS2 minus those lost to HS2 by the rest of the railway. Further the benefits are reduced by the loss of tax income due to motorists transferring to the train.

We comment, if people were willing to pay, the system would be profitable. Moreover the theory reduces to the absurd. The proof follows.
Changing the tax regime cannot change the resources used but would change the costs to Government. Similarly, changes in fares policy would change nothing fundamental but would change the incremental fares. Further, if, for example, the rest of the railway were outside the Government then the incremental fares would be the full fares taken by the new route. The analysis would then come out ever so much better. On the other hand, if the Government came to own all the motorway filling stations and cafes, or other elements of the economy, then losses to those elements, due to passenger spending on HS2 tickets, would also be subtracted from the HS2 fares, so increasing the cost to Government no end.

A theory, which provides different answers according to the quirks of the tax system, the fares’ structure, or according to the quirks of Government ownership is clearly absurd. This one has been invented because, without it, no railway project would ever see the light of day. Our view is that it is a fraud on the taxpayer. If they want to build railways they should give the true reasons rather than invent a fraudulent “economic case”.

Paul Withrington, director of Transport Watch comments:

“We do not have “brown envelopes” in this country but, in the light of the above we may conclude that there is corruption in that officials and their consultants appear to be prepared to say almost anything in return for salaries in the hundreds of thousands of pounds. It will not do”

For more details, or to arrange an interview, please contact Paul Withrington on 01604 847438 or pwith@transport-watch.co.uk and open topic 17.

About Transport Watch
Transport Watch is an independent think tank founded in October 2002. Our objective is to become the non-governmental point of reference for factual data dealing with transport generally and road and rail in particular. For full details visit: http://www.transport-watch.co.uk/

The report by the Economic Affairs Committee of the House of Lords cites the net cost to Government of the full high-speed rail network as £31.5 billion at the 2011 price and discount base, but these are weasel words. Let us be clear what they mean.

They mean the sum which, if invested at the Treasury discount rate (principally 3.5%), would fund the construction cost and all future costs, minus the fares, out to the remote year of 2093.

The words are “weasel” because of the choice of 2011 as the discount base. For example, change that to 2001 and, HURRAH, the sum falls to £22bn. Instead the honourable discount base is the opening year, 2033. Rolling the £31.5bn at 3.5% between 2011 and 2033 yields £66bn.

That is the actuarial loss, at 2011 prices, which will be faced by those standing in the opening year – supposing the cost is as claimed and supposing the fares come in. It is the £66bn which the Lords should focus on, not the £31.5bn.

By 2033 over £50bn will have been spent, or perhaps £80bn as suggested by Dr Wellings of the IEA, if the costs of the links to the new stations etc. are included. Apart from technical underestimates the cost may have spiralled because of the shortages which will arise in the construction industry when faced with this huge project.

Hence taken in the round the actuarial loss faced by those standing in the opening year of 2033 is likely to be at least £70bn. That is equivalent to £2,500 for every household in the land, 99 percent of which may seldom if ever use the system. After all nearly half the population use a train less than once a year and 90% of rail journeys are less than 80 miles long.

So if we assign the 70bn to the one percent likely to make significant use of HS2 the cost amounts to an astonishing £250,000 per household.
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Paul Withrington, director of Transport Watch comments:

“In the face of such gigantic losses why on earth is anyone contemplating this scheme”

“People from households in the top 20% percent of income travel four to five times as much by rail as do those from households in the bottom or second to bottom 20%. Those who may make regular use of HS2 will be overwhelmingly from the better off. Why on earth should they attract such a vast subsidy?”

“The costs cited by HS2 take us to Manchester, Liverpool and Leeds. However, pressure will build to extend the system to Edinburgh and Glasgow leading to additional loss making expenditure in the tens of billions of pounds2.

“Why should the taxpayer subsidise this vast folly? It is no more sensible than pouring tens of billions of pounds into Harrods, Fortnum and Mason or some loss-making chain of fast food shops”.
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For more details, or to arrange an interview, please contact Paul Withrington on 01604 847438 or pwith@transport-watch.co.uk and open topic 17.

Dear Sirs,

RAIL COSTS

I see that Mr Carne appeared before you following the “astonishing” cost escalation of the Great Western Electrification; up from an original £874 million to £2.8 billion and rising.
That reminds me of the scandal of the West Cost Main Line Modernisation programme. It was to cost £2.35bn in 1997, £2.95 bn in March 1999, £4.75bn in October 1999, £5.56bn in January 2000 and £5.8bn at the start of the Public Inquiry in February 2001. The price rose to £6.3bn during the inquiry when there were press reports that it would cost £9bn. By August 2002 the press was reporting £13bn, but that was cut to £10bn after the Regulator struck out the enhancements required for 150 mph speeds. (Pity, such trains would have negated the “need” for HS2. ……).

Worse still, and among other, Mr Carne said that the reopening of the Borders line in Scotland had been completed on time and within budget. Rubbish, the original capital cost was £72m, at Parliamentary approval, £155m. Now nobody knows because £60m of land acquisition and preparatory costs were taken out and all the quite massive road realignments shifted to the roads budget. Statements of “over £360m” are not challenged by the rail lobby. On budget? On bodger more like it – the man must be “joking”.
Separately from costs, Bombardier said to the Transport Committee of the House of Commons, during an Inquiry into the Future of the Railway that, “To give a few figures. To carry 50,000 people in one direction we would need:

• A 175 m road used by cars, or
• A 35 m wide road used by buses, or
• A 9 m wide track bed for a metro or commuter railway”
(Ev 479 in Volume 2 of the Seventh Report of Session 2003-04).

In contrast, in New York we have a contra flow express coach lane 11 feet wide and 4 miles long, including 1.5 miles in tunnel. It carries close to 700 45-seat coaches in the peak hour, offering 30,000 seats. The coaches may as well be 75-seaters. At 100 kph and with 1,000 per hour the headways would average 100metres, or over 80 bumper to bumper; more than is commonly seen on motorways. That would provide 75,000 seats per hour. Hence, rather than the metro providing the greater capacity, it is the express coach with a dedicated track. That combination would provide seats for all in place of the metro’s standing and crushed conditions and at a fraction the cost.

Against that background why does anyone believe anything that the railway lobby says?
Yours faithfully

Paul F Withrington
Director Transport-Watch

More evidence on how government “cooked the books” to justify HS2

The previous Transport Watch press release showed that the percentage on business, assumed by HS2 in its latest economic analyses, is far above that suggested by survey data. Without that boost the scheme would fail the cost benefit test, but it gets worse.

The table below sets out the sources of the supposed benefits in £(millions).

Item                                                                        Phase 1          Full Network
(1).Improved Access ………………………………1,094 …………….1,115
(2) Reduced crowding …………………………… 4,068 …………….7,514
(3) Quicker interchange ……………………………. 810 …………….4,146
(4) Reduced waiting ……………………………….3,508 ……………. 8,081
(5) Reduced walking ……………………………….. 404 ……………..1,330
(6) Reduced train time …………………………..11,518 …………… 31,007
(7) Improved reliability ……………………………. 2,624 ……………. 5,496
Totals …………………………………………….. 24,026 …………… 58,689
Benefits to road users ……………………………… 568 ……………. 1,162
Total excluding Wider Economic benefits ………24,594 …………… 59,851
Contentious Items total [(1)+(3)+(5)+(7)] ………..4,932 …………… 12,087

Astonishingly only circa 50% of the benefits are due to reduced train time, a factor not hitherto noticed by the Transport Committee of the House of Commons or by the Economic Affairs Committee of the House of Lords.

Transport watch points out that out that several of the other items are implausible.

• Why on earth will access, item (1) above, be better. It may well be worse. Stations may be more remote.
• The trains are immensely long, up to 200 metres. The new platforms will be relatively remote from other services. Hence, Interchange may be worse, item (3) above, and walking, item (5) may be extended rather than shortened. Certainly that is the case at Euston.
• Improved reliability, item (7) above is supposed to generate £5.5 billion for the full network. For heaven’s sake; surely the trains can be made to run on time without building a vastly expensive, heavily loss making, high-speed rail network?

Striking those contentious items out would remove benefits worth £5bn from Phase 1 and £12bn from the full network. That alone would destroy the economic case for both.

Paul Withrington, director of Transport Watch comments:
“The more one digs into the detail the weaker that case becomes. It is insupportable that £50 billion should be hazarded on such fragile grounds”.
“The supposed benefits put forward by HS2 Ltd do not stand examination. At the least a risk factor should be applied in case the forecast passenger do not arise and in recognition of the fragility of the other assumptions. An overall reduction of as little as 20% would destroy the case which, even in its present optimistic form, is desperately weak.

For more details, or to arrange an interview, please contact Paul Withrington on 01604 847438 or pwith@transport-watch.co.uk and open topic 17.

About Transport Watch Transport Watch is an independent think tank founded in October 2002. Our objective is to become the non-governmental point of reference for factual data dealing with transport generally and road and rail in particular. For full details visit: http://www.transport-watch.co.uk/

Percentage on business: The evidence suggests government “cooked the books” to justify HS2

The evidence suggests the government has “cooked the books” in order to exaggerate the economic benefits of High Speed 2.

The Economic Affairs Committee of the House of Lords found that that the government dramatically ramped up the percentage of business travel in its latest modelling. The new values are far in excess of those available from the National Rail Passenger Survey.

Weekday proportion on business
Route HS2………………. “Model” …………Actual values
London-Manchester……… 64% ……………….39.9%
London-Liverpool …………48%………………..33.2%
London-Sheffield…………..65%………………..56.5%
London-Leeds……………..56%………………..45.1%
London-Birmingham………55%………………..42.5%
Sources: House of Lords, Prout letter, National Rail Passenger Survey

Transport Watch finds that the government now assumes roughly 40% of HS2 trips over a 7-day week will be on business compared to an actual figure of under 30%.

Because business time is valued five times as highly as other time this provides a massive boost to the economic case for HS2, conveniently compensating for the Government’s admission that business users can actually work on trains.

Without that boost (and other significant sleight of hand) the economic case for HS2 would have collapsed – the benefit to cost ratios would have fallen to just 1.0 for Phase 1 and to 1.3 for the full network – extremely poor value compared with alternative transport projects.
When the wider costs of the tax funding for HS2 are factored in, this suggests there is a high risk that the costs of the scheme will outweigh the benefits – benefits which are, in any case, highly contentious.
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Paul Withrington of Transport-Watch comments:

“The apparent manipulation of the travel forecasts is a smoking gun for HS2”.
“The government has dramatically increased the proportion of business trips compared with the real-world data, massively inflating the business case”
“A realistic assessment would show that the all important benefit to cost ratios for HS2 are likely to be far below those which would justify the project”.
“This should be the final nail in the coffin for this ill-conceived scheme”
“Nobody contests the fact that this vastly expensive scheme will make a financial loss in the tens of billions of pounds”.

For more details, or to arrange an interview, please contact Paul Withrington on 01604 847438 or pwith@transport-watch.co.uk and open topic 17.

About Transport Watch
Transport Watch is an independent think tank founded in October 2002. Our objective is to become the non-governmental point of reference for factual data dealing with transport generally and road and rail in particular. For full details visit: http://www.transport-watch.co.uk/

The values of time used in the January 2012 and October 2013 studies are as follows

£ per hour              Business       Commute    Leisure
January 2012           47.18                6.46              5.71
October 2013           31.96               6.81              6.04

The Economic Affairs Committee of the House of Lords is scathing. Here is a sample from the Committee’s report, ‘The Economics of High Speed 2’ published in March 2015.

At paragraph 378:
“The values of non-work travel time savings are based on surveys of motorists from 1994. We are not convinced that basing values of time on outdated surveys of motorists is the best way of calculating some of the benefits of a major rail project; rail users can use journey time productively. 33 per cent of the net transport benefits of HS2 are derived from these values (£19.3 billion). The Department for Transport has conceded that the data are old and that fresh evidence is required.”

At paragraphs 395 and 396:-
“The values of working time savings for rail do not take account of the fact that time on a train can be used productively. The Institute of Transport Studies at the University of Leeds concluded that the evidence behind the values was unclear. 70 per cent of the net transport benefits of HS2 derived from these values (£40.5 billion)”.

“82 per cent of the estimated total benefits of HS2 are derived from the value placed on work and non-work travel time. We find it difficult to have any faith in benefits that have been estimated on the basis of these values, particularly as the Department for Transport has recently concluded that fresh evidence is required and has commissioned further research”.

We comment, the fact that HS2 Ltd and the Government hang over £50bn of expenditure off values subject to such criticism is quite extraordinary, but it gets far worse.

We pick out two key finding from the report by Mott Macdonald of June 2009 with the title “Productive Use of Rail Travel Time and the Valuation of Travel Time Savings for Rail Business Travellers” produced for the DfT.

“It was found that the proportion of business travellers working on the train was, in Spring 2008, 82% for an outbound journey, and 77% on the return journey, a significantly higher value than the figure of 52% obtained from the National Passenger Survey (NPS) in Autumn 2004, the last comparable dataset. For those that spent some time working, the percentage of journey time spent working was 60% on the outward leg, and 54% on the return leg. For both directions combined, this corresponds to 46% of journey time by all business travellers being spent working”

“In economic appraisal, if work is done on the train, it has to be appraised in terms of the working time needed were that to be done in the usual office environment. The SPURT surveys showed that some two-thirds (68%) of working business travellers would take “about the same” amount of time, 8% would take “more” time (on average 29 minutes more) and a quarter (24%) would take “less” time (on average 18 minutes less). Across all journey lengths a slight saving of 1.7 minutes per journey would be realised in the usual workplace as compared to the train, this corresponds approximately to a 97% efficiency of working on-train compared with at-workplace”

Unfortunately the report does not tell us the proportion of time used when an employee arrives at work. That will vary according to the task but, with coffee breaks, dream time and interruptions one can well imagine only half is truly heads down for people likely to be sent off on business trips. The other office time may be used similarly to the non-working time when on a train. A report in the Times of a study carried out by Microsoft said that typically workers wasted, or were not working for, three hours of each working day, not counting lunch breaks. If so then the value of train time savings for people on business may reasonable be set close to zero – obviously destroying the economic case for HS2.

We also have the Institute of Transport studies (Leeds) report of April 2013 with the title Valuation of Travel Time for Business passengers. The conclusion on page 10 says “It is clear that there is no consensus on the theoretical underpinnings of the business value of time. Whilst the Cost Saving Approach dominates international appraisal practice, several practitioners have reservations about its theoretical underpinning”. Table 6.4 provides a range for the values of business time for rail with 60% of seats taken of £19 to £60 per hour for long distance rail depending on the methodology used.
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We comment:
“With uncertainty on that scale lurking in the background, why is this scheme even being considered? Even on the incredibly optimistic assumptions embedded within the analysis it is a loser.”

“These analysis are not worth the paper they are written on. Instead decisions should be made on a financial basis – namely if it makes a loss in the tens of of billions of pounds, for heaves sake do not build it”

“High speed rail is not a ‘public Service’ worthy of subsidy. Neither is Rail. After all rail is used overwhelmingly by the better off. Why should they be subsidised?”
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For more details, or to arrange an interview, please contact Paul Withrington on 01604 847438 or pwith@transport-watch.co.uk and open topic 17.